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China's Evolving Company Legislation:
A Status Report
Preston M. Torbert *
I. INTRODUCTION
The traditional Communist country with a planned economy and
state-owned enterprises had no need for a company law. In the Soviet
Union and other Communist countries, factories were organized as state
enterprises owned by the state and administered by managers appointed
by the government department that supervised the enterprise's activities.
The same was true for China.' Although China did have "companies"
that were administrative subdivisions below the ministries and above the
factories or conducted foreign trade activities,2 it did not have any public
company law that governed the establishment and operation of such enti-
ties. There was no need for such legislation because almost all industrial
entities were state-owned and were covered by legislation on state enter-
* Partner, Baker & McKenzie, Chicago.
I See GENE TIDRICK & CHEN JIYUAN, CHINA'S INDUSTRIAL REFORM 277-312 (1987).
2 Id. at 294. Since 1979, the government started the experimental transformation of state enter-
prises into the "companies" or "corporations." These companies or corporations, also called "gen-
eral factories" or "technical cooperation centers" are composed of related enterprises. By 1981,
19,336 enterprises (15% of the total state enterprises) were incorporated into 1,983 companies or
corporations. The goal of this transformation was to enhance the efficiency and the economies of
scale of the industries. See Briefing Conference on Reform of Industrial Managerial Institution con-
vened by the National Economic Commission and the State Council, March 14, 1981, in I COLLEC-
TION OF LEGAL DOCUMENTS ON CHINA'S ECONOMIC & MANAGERIAL REFORM 43, 47 (1985).
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prises.3 In China, as in other Communist countries, private enterprises
have existed, but have only assumed a significant role in China's national
economy since the economic reforms starting in 1979. For the most part,
private enterprise has been limited to small scale businesses in the form
of "individual businesses" in accordance with the Certain Policy Regula-
tions of the State Council on the Township Non-Agricultural Individual
Economy issued on July 7, 1981 or of "private enterprises" in accordance
with the Provisional Regulations of the PRC on Private Enterprise issued
on June 25, 1988.4 Though state-owned enterprises employ 75% of
China's urban labor force, they provide for only half of the nation's in-
dustrial output.
5
As China's economic reforms have progressed, however, the need
for a company law has become apparent. The two principal reasons are,
first, the need to reform existing state-owned enterprises and, second, the
need to create a means for foreign investment in reformed state-owned
enterprises. For political reasons, there appears to be no perceived need
for the company law to encourage larger privately-owned enterprises.
In one sense, China has had a company law since 1979, but only one
that applied to joint ventures between foreign and Chinese entities. This
is the Law of the PRC on Sino-Foreign Joint Venture Enterprises (the
"Joint Venture Law").6 Since this law applies only to closely held enter-
prises formed by Chinese and foreign parties, it could not serve as appro-
priate company legislation for all of China's state-owned enterprises.
China's economic reform policy has emphasized the need for greater
efficiency in state-owned enterprises, which constitute the largest em-
ployer in the economy.7 To date, efforts to increase the efficiency of
state-owned enterprises have emphasized the separation of management
from ownership.8 In most cases, this has meant the retention of state
3 The major laws on the reform of state enterprise management include the Regulations for
Worker & Staff Conference of the Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People of 1981, the
Regulations for the Work of the Directors of the Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People
of 1986, and the Regulations for the Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People of 1988.
Provisional Regulations of State-Owned Industrial Enterprises, in II CHINA LAWS FOR FOREIGN
BUSINESS (CCH) 1 16,541-81 (1993).
4 COMPILATION OF ECONOMIC AND COMMERICAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE PRC
542-43 (F. Xue ed., 1983); see also II CHINA LAWS FOR FOREIGN BUSINESS (CCH) 15 13,546(7)-
(48) (1993).
5 Sheryl WuDunn, For Sale: Creaky Gears of Chinese Communism, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1993,
§ 4, at 7.
6 I CHINA LAWS FOR FOREIGN BUSINESS (CCH) 7801-09 (1993). Since 1986, the Regula-
tions on Foreign-Related Companies in the Special Economic Zones in Guangdong Province have
existed, but these have rarely been used. Id. at 82,740-825.
7 For an overview of the reforms, see JAMES M. ETHRIDGE, CHANGING CHINA 78-140 (1988).
8 See Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Economic
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ownership, but management by factory directors who enjoy greater au-
thority to make decisions regarding the enterprise's activities without in-
terference from state planning or other supervisory authorities.9 China
has also allowed, on an experimental basis, changes in ownership to in-
lude the acquisition of shares in state-owned enterprises by employees
and, in some cases, by third parties. 10 The creation of the stock markets
in Shanghai and Shenzhen in the last two years is evidence of this experi-
mentation in changes in ownership.1
Until 1992, the transformation of Chinese state-owned enterprises
into companies and the issuance of shares to employees or third parties
was done on an ad hoc basis.12 Last year, however, saw the publication
of three regulations on companies, one at the national level and two at
the local level. The national regulation' is the Regulatory Opinion on
Joint Stock Companies of May 15, 1992 issued by the State Economic
Institutional Reform Committee (the "Regulatory Opinion").13 The two
local regulations are the Provisional Regulations of Shenzhen Municipal-
ity Concerning Joint Stock Companies promulgated by the Shenzhen
Municipal Government on March 17, 1992 (the "Shenzhen Regula-
tions"),14 and the Provisional Regulations of Shanghai Municipality
Concerning Joint Stock Companies promulgated by the Shanghai Munic-
ipal Government on May 18, 1992 (the "Shanghai Regulations").
(These separate regulations are referred to collectively hereinafter as the
"Company Legislation.")
Institutional Reform, October 20, 1984, in I COLLECTION OF LEGAL DOCUMENTS ON CHINA'S
ECONOMIC & MANAGERIAL REFORM 5-6 (1985).
9 The government did allow some small state enterprises to be sold to individuals. See Provi-
sional Measures for Selling the Titles of State Owned Small Enterprises (1989) (in author's
possession).
10 Jia Zhao & Qian Li, Trading Stocks in China: Development, Regulation, Issues and Prospects,
E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., June 1992, at 8.
11 The People's Bank of China views the stock exchanges established in Shanghai and Shenzhen
as experiments and the financial assets traded in the exchanges will principally be treasury and
company bonds. See The Office of People's Bank of China on Development of China's Securities
Market, PEOPLE'S DAILY (overseas edition), June 20, 1992.
12 Until 1987 state owned enterprises were not allowed to issue stocks. Only collective enter-
prises could issue stocks upon approval. See The Directive of the State Council on Reinforcement of
Administration on Stocks and Bonds, March 28, 1987, in Zhao & Li, supra note 10. Upon special
permission of the central government, the first stock issued by state owned enterprises was made
possible in 1988 for the Shenyang Jinbei (Gold Cup) Auto Industrial Shareholding Corporation. Id.
13 The Regulatory Opinion on Joint Stock Companies, SHENZHEN SPECIAL ZONE NEWSPAPER
June 19, 1992, at 2 (in author's possession).
14 The Provisional Regulations of Shenzhen Municipality Concerning Joint Stock Company,
SHENZHEN SPECIAL ZONE NEWSPAPER, March 18, 1992, at 5 (in author's possession).
15 The Provisional Regulations of Shanghai Municipality Concerning Joint Stock Company,
SHENZHEN SPECIAL ZONE NEWSPAPER (no date or pagination available) (in author's possession).
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These regulations are generally similar and all seem to provide an
adequate basis for establishing companies in China. It appears, however,
that they are viewed primarily as experimental, because there are reports
that a new national company law is being drafted and may be presented
to the National People's Congress as early as this year.16 Given past
experience and the volatility of China's political situation, however, it is
possible that the proposed new national legislation will be delayed for
some time. This article, therefore, examines the existing legislation both
as being of interest in and of itself, and as being the possible precursor of
future legislation.
II. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COMPANY LEGISLATION
The Company Legislation addresses a company form familiar in
many capitalist countries: a company limited by shares. The basic char-
acteristics of the joint stock company as provided for in the Company
Legislation are as follows:
The number of promoters and shareholders is limited to a minimum of
3 (in the Regulatory Opinion and the Shanghai Regulations) or a minimum
of 5 (in the Shenzhen Regulations).
17
The promoters generally must be legal persons (excluding wholly for-
eign-owned enterprises or Chinese private enterprises) or authorized gov-
ernment departments.18
The company is liable for its obligations to the extent of all of its assets
and its shareholders bear liability for the company's debts to the extent of
the shares they have subscribed to.
19
The initial purchase of shares can be made with cash, tangible or intan-
gible property.
The minimum registered capital of a company is 10 million Renminbi
(approximately US$1,750,000 at the current official exchange rate) (5 mil-
lion Renminbi under the Shenzhen and Shanghai Regulations) or for a
company with foreign investment 30 million Renminbi.2 '
Both common and preferred shares are permitted. Preferred shares
receive dividends at a fixed rate.2 2
Shareholders are subject to certain restrictions on the transfer of their
shares (e.g., a promoter may not transfer its shares in the first year of the
16 The draft of the Joint Stock Company Law and the draft of the Limited Liability Company
Law were presented to the National People's Congress on February 15, 1993. These drafts were to
be reviewed during the 30th session of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.
See WORLD DAILY, February 20, 1993 (in Chinese).
17 Supra note 13, art. 9; note 15, art. 14; note 14, art. 11.
18 Supra note 13, art. 10; note 14, art. 12; note 15, art. 13.
19 Supra note 13, art. 1; note 14, art. 3; note 15, art. 2.
20 Supra note 13, art. 22; note 14, art. 50; note 15, art. 32.
21 Supra note 13, art. 12; note 14, arts. 13, 41; note 15, art. 17.
22 Supra note 13, art. 23; note 14, art. 51; note 15, art. 36.
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company under the National Regulations or 2 years under the Shenzhen
Regulations).23
The shareholders meeting is the highest authority of a company. Spe-
cial resolutions (those on certain specified issues) must be adopted by a two-
thirds majority vote at a shareholders meeting with a two-thirds quorum
requirement. Other resolutions may be adopted by a simple majority of
votes at a shareholders meeting with a simple majority quorum. Each share
has one vote; there are no cumulative voting procedures.2 4
The board of directors consists of no less than 5 directors and the total
number of directors must be an odd number under the Regulatory Opinion
(in Shanghai and Shenzhen the minimum number is 3 and there is no re-
quirement for an odd number). Decisions by the board of directors on cer-
tain specified issues require a greater than two-thirds majority vote, while
others only require a simple majority vote. The chairman has a casting vote
in the event of a deadlock.25
Under the Shanghai and Shenzhen Regulations, the company must
also establish a supervisory board to represent the employees and the share-
holders to supervise the activities of management and the board (the estab-
lishment of such a board appears to be optional under the Regulatory
Opinion).
2 6
In general, the joint stock company contemplated under the Com-
pany Legislation is similar to corporate forms found in both civil and
common law as well as former Communist jurisdictions in the former
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.27
III. SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COMPANY LEGISLATION
While the joint stock company contemplated by the Company Leg-
islation shares many characteristics with similar company forms in other
jurisdictions, it also possesses certain special characteristics determined
by China's situation. China is a socialist country ruled, in effect, by a
Communist party,28 but with an interest in transforming its state enter-
prises and with a growing private sector and free market economy.
23 Supra note 13, art. 30(4); note 14, arts. 56, 58, 59; note 15, art. 44.
24 Supra note 13, arts. 39, 43, 46, 47; note 14, arts. 98, 103, 104, 106; note 15, arts. 61, 64-67.
25 Supra note 13, arts. 52, 55; note 14, arts. 109, 112; note 15, arts. 70, 78 (the Shanghai Regula-
tions do not provide for a casting vote by the Chairman).
26 Supra note 13, art. 63; note 14, art. 126; note 15, art. 89.
27 See, eg., COMPANY LAW, A COMPILATION OF THE LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 331-
466 (1971); Illinois Business Corporation Act, 805 ILCS 5/1.01 et seq. (1983); SP SSSR, No. 601
(Dec. 25, 1990) (Statute on Joint Stock Corporations, approved by Russian Soviet Federated Social-
ist Republic Council of Ministers Decree No. 601); Joint Stock Companies Act of the Czechoslovak
Federated Republic, zikon c.104/1990 Sb.
28 The Preamble to the Constitution of the People's Republic of China provides that the Com-
munist Party of China will continue to be the leading force of China in the socialist construction
(Preamble). See Constitution of the People's Republic of China, in I CHINA LAWS FOR FOREIGN
BUSINESS (CCH) 5301-83 (1983).
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China is also a country which must address the question of how to treat
people of Chinese heritage currently living in Hong Kong or Taiwan.
The Company Legislation reflects these characteristics in several respects
as noted below.
A. Reorganization of Existing State-Owned Enterprises
China's economic reforms address many issues common to the
countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. China, how-
ever, has not used the term "privatization" to describe its policies toward
state-owned enterprises. Instead, it refers to the "reorganization" of ex-
isting state enterprises into companies. Thus, the Company Legislation
provides that a preexisting state enterprise, when being reorganized into
a company, must invest all of its assets into the company and become a
promoter of the company. If the preexisting enterprise is not a promoter,
the owner of the assets of the preexisting enterprise is to be the
promoter.29
The primary reasons for transforming an existing state-owned enter-
prise into a company are to increase its economic efficiency and to elimi-
nate continuing losses that state-owned enterprises are incurring. The
Company Legislation, however, does not address clearly the issue of the
preexisting debts of a transformed enterprise. It states that upon its reor-
ganization, the debts of a preexisting state enterprise are liquidated.3"
But it also provides that the company established through reorganization
assumes the debts of the preexisting enterprise.3" It is unclear whether
the reorganized entity starts with a clean slate.
B. Government Supervision over the Company
Since the land and other major assets of existing state enterprises in
China are owned by the state, it is reasonable for the state to exercise
supervision to protect its property. The Company Legislation reflects
this interest in supervision in the following ways:
Competent government industrial and commercial authorities must re-
view and approve the establishment of a company.
32
In applying for the establishment of a company, proof of the
creditworthiness of the promoters is required.33
29 Supra note 13, art. 11; note 14, arts. 35, 38. The Shanghai Regulations do not have any
specific provisions on the reorganization of state owned enterprises into joint stock companies, but
they seem to contemplate the contribution of existing assets as capital; see supra note 15, art. 19(2).
30 Supra note 13, art. 11; note 14, art. 15(2).
31 Supra note 13, art. 11; note 14, art. 35.
32 Supra note 13, art. 13(1); note 14, art. 14; note 15, art. 19.
33 Supra note 13, art. 15(6).
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Special approval is required from the institutional reform authority
and the People's Bank for the recall or withholding of stock.
34
The company must also observe national industrial policy and indus-
trial and regional development programs in increasing its capital.3 5
Certain individuals are precluded from acting as a director or president
of a company including those who are disqualified from assuming such po-
sitions under "the policy of the state.",
3 6
The uses of the legal profit reserve fund and the capital reserve fund
are limited to certain purposes including "other uses required [or stipu-
lated] by the state.",
37
Provisions subject to a two-thirds majority vote of the shareholders
meeting (e.g., changes in the company's business scope or the total volume
of shares) require approval from the institutional reform authority.38
For a merger of the enterprise, a merger application must be filed with
the original authority in charge of the company's industry as well as from
the authorized government department.3 9
A common complaint by managers of state enterprises in China is
that they have too many "mothers-in-law" (i.e., government departments
which interfere in their work).40 From the Company Legislation, it ap-
pears that a joint stock company will also have several "mothers-in-law."
These include the State Administration of Industry and Commerce, the
financial and tax authorities, the institutional reform authority and the
People's Bank of China. The State Administration may impose penalties
on a company for failure to process various prescribed items or meet time
limits established by the Regulatory Opinion.4 The financial or tax au-
thorities may also impose penalties on a company for violations of provi-
sions on the termination and reporting on remuneration for directors,
false record keeping and failure to use reserve funds in compliance with
34 Supra note 13, art. 32. For similar requirements concerning reduction of capital in the
Shenzhen Regulations and Shanghai Regulations, see supra note 14, art. 74; note 15, arts. 54, 51(5).
35 Supra note 13, art. 35; note 14, art. 62(4); note 15, art. 46(3).
36 Supra note 13, art. 61(6); note 14, art. 123(7); note 15, art. 72(4) (director only).
37 Supra note 13, art. 72(3); note 14, art. 136(3); note 15, art. 103(3).
38 See generally note 13, art. 83; note 14, art. 161(4) (amendment of articles of association); note
15, art. 126(3).
39 Supra note 13, arts. 89, 94; note 14, art. 144 (municipal government and People's Bank of
China); note 15, arts. 117, 123.
40 "In the past, the central and local governments, on the one hand, took too much responsibility
in managing many things that the government should not control. On the other hand there were
many things that the government should control but failed to do so. The governments messed up
their administrative functions with enterprise operations. The enterprises thus became the attach-
ment of the governments. The difficult situation of enterprises became even worse because of the
bureaucracy created by the division of administrative power among industrial departments and those
between the central government and local authorities." Provisional Measures for Selling the Titles
of State Owned Small Enterprises, in I COLLECTION OF LEGAL DOCUMENTs ON CHINA'S Eco-
NOMIC & MANAGERIAL REFORM 6 (1985).
41 Supra note 13, art. 104.
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the Regulatory Opinion.42 The institutional reform authority may im-
pose penalties on the company if documents submitted by promoters
contain false statements, if the company fails to operate according to its
articles of association and for other specified reasons.43 The People's
Bank may also impose penalties if the promoters, staff or workers of a
company hold shares in violation of the provisions of the Regulatory
Opinion, or if the company issues shares without approval and in other
specified cases.4 The Shenzhen Regulations have similar provisions; the
Shanghai Regulations have a broad reference to supervision and control
by government departments.45
Companies in other jurisdictions are subject to requirements of the
securities and tax authorities. The proposed level of government supervi-
sion in the company legislation in China, however, particularly the re-
quirement of approval for certain activities by government authorities,
seems to exceed that in jurisdictions with free market economies. This
appears to be due to the need in China for the state to protect its property
in the form of state-owned enterprises reorganized into companies.
C. Restrictions on Shareholders' Freedom of Action
The Company Legislation restricts the shareholders' freedom of ac-
tion in a number of respects. While some of these restrictions may not be
substantial or apply in the ordinary case, they may in other cases unduly
limit the shareholders' freedom of action.
A number of the restrictions concern the establishment of the com-
pany. Under the Regulatory Opinion, the company must, for example,
have at least 3 promoters and, as noted above, a certain minimum regis-
tered capital.4" Further, of the registered capital, generally no more than
20% may be paid for with intangible assets.47 Also, the shares sub-
scribed by the promoters through public offering may not be less than
35% of the registered capital.48 The Shanghai and Shenzhen regulations
impose similar restrictions.49
Other limitations concern transfers of shares. An enterprise holding
more than 10% of the shares of another company cannot purchase
42 Supra note 13, art. 105.
43 Supra note 13, art. 106.
44 Supra note 13, art. 107.
45 Supra note 14, arts. 174-76; note 15, art. 8.
46 Supra note 13, arts. 9, 12.
47 Supra note 13, art. 22.
48 Supra note 13, art. 8.
49 Supra note 14, art. 11 (five promoters and 35% subscribed by them through public offering);
note 15, arts. 10, 14 (3 promoters, 30% subscribed by promoters through public offering).
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shares of that company.50 Shares subscribed by the staff and workers of a
company cannot exceed 10% of the total shares issued to the public.51
The promoters may not transfer their shares during the first year of the
company's existence, and a director or president cannot transfer his
shares for 3 years during his term. 2 Further, an individual wishing to
acquire more than 10% of the shares of a public issuance company must
obtain approval from the People's Bank and the institutional reform
authority.
53
Restrictions also apply to certain financial aspects of the company.
For example, the time interval between increases of capital through the
offering of new shares is 12 months, and no more shares may be offered if
dividends on preferred shares have not been paid for 2 consecutive
years. 
54
Perhaps the restrictions that will most affect a company's normal
operations are those on voting at shareholders and board meetings. The
quorum and majority vote requirements noted above for both sharehold-
ers and board meetings appear to be mandatory.5 Thus, they may not
be altered by the parties by providing otherwise in the articles of associa-
tion. While these requirements may be appropriate in the case of large
publicly held entities, they may be prejudicial to the interests of investors
in companies with a small number of shareholders. For example, the
requirement in the Regulatory Opinion for a casting vote by the chair-
man may allow one party in a closely held company to override the
wishes of the other party or parties.
56
Limitations on the shareholders' freedom of action are not unusual
in company laws. In this case, however, the restrictions seem to be
greater than in many other jurisdictions.57 This may be due to the gov-
ernment's interest in protecting the shareholders from their own well-
intentioned but misguided actions, as well as from manipulation by other
50 Supra note 13, art. 24(2); note 14, art. 75.
51 Supra note 13, art. 24(3); note 14, art. 75.
52 Supra note 13, arts. 30(4), 30(6); note 14, arts. 58, 125 (2 year restriction on directors); note
15, art. 34 (2 year restriction on promoters).
53 Supra note 13, art. 31.
54 Supra note 13, arts. 36, 38.
55 Supra note 13, arts. 46, 47; note 14, arts. 103-105; note 15, arts. 65-67.
56 Supra note 13, arts. 52, 55. But see note 14, arts. 109, 112: Shenzhen requires that the mini-
mum number of board members is five and an odd number is not required. See also note 15, arts. 70-
83: Shenzhen requires five board members as the minimum and an odd number is not required. See
also note 15, arts. 70-83. Shanghai requires a minimum of three board members but the chairman
does not have a casting vote.
57 See, e.g., representative sources cited supra note 27.
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shareholders. The price for such protection, however, is a higher level of
inconvenience and inefficiency in the use of this corporate form in China.
D. Protection of Employees
One would expect China, as a socialist country, to provide some
measures in the Company Legislation to protect employees. This is par-
ticularly true for existing state-owned enterprises that are being reorga-
nized into companies. As a general matter, the government supervisory
departments noted above will probably exercise some degree of protec-
tion for workers. In addition, specific provisions in the Company Legis-
lation seek to protect the interests of the workers. For example, the
Regulatory Opinion limits the assignment of stock warrants held by in-
ternal staff and workers among themselves in closely held companies and
prohibits the transfer of any shares a company has allocated to its inter-
nal staff and workers (except those that have left the company or died)
within 3 years after the allocation.58 In addition, at least one-third or
more of the supervisors, but no more than one-half, are to be representa-
tives of the company's employees and are to be appointed and dismissed
by the employees. 9 Further, the company must establish a collective
benefit fund for the welfare of the employees and allocate profits to it
before paying any dividends. There is, however, no requirement as to the
size or amount of this fund.'
While these provisions may be more protective of the employees
than those in some jurisdictions, they do not provide as much protection
as might be expected. For example, when an existing state-owned enter-
prise is transformed into a company, there is no requirement as there is
in some East Europrean legislation6" that the employees receive shares in
the company free of charge or at preferential prices. The Company Leg-
islation does not require the obligatory issuance gratis to workers and
employees of stock in a reorganized state enterprise and limits the shares
subscribed by internal staff and workers of a designated issuance com-
pany to 20% of the total shares of the company (or 10% of the total
shares of a public issuance company). 2 It appears, therefore, that the
58 Supra note 13, arts. 30(1), 30(5). See also arts. 30(1), 59 of the Shenzhen Regulations, supra
note 14.
59 Supra note 13, art. 64. See also note 14, art. 127; note 15, art. 90. Both the Shenzhen Regula-
tions and the Shanghai Regulations provide that the percentage of supervisors elected by the staff
and workers is one-third.
60 Supra note 13, art. 74. For Shanghai Regulations, see supra note 15, art. 105.
61 ROMAN FRYDMAN ET AL., THE PRIVATIZATION PROCESS IN CENTRAL EUROPE 29-30, 137-
38 (1993) (Bulgaria).
62 Supra note 13, art. 24(3). The Shenzhen Regulations also prohibit a company from gratui-
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provisions in the Company Legislation protecting employees should not
pose a significant burden for the companies or a substantial disincentive
for prospective foreign investors.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN INVESTORS
The Company Legislation imposes a number of restrictions on for-
eign investors. The Regulatory Opinion provides, for example, that a
wholly foreign-owned enterprise may not be a promoter of a company
and that Chinese foreign joint ventures acting as promoters may not ex-
ceed one-third of the total promoters.63 As noted above, the minimum
registered capital for a company with foreign investment is 3 times that
of a company without foreign investment ($30 million RMB as opposed
to $10 million RMB).6" Further, foreign investors and investors from the
Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan areas of China may not purchase or
trade stock shares denominated in RMB (called "A shares"). 65 They
may only purchase special shares of stock denominated in Renminbi
(called "B shares") which are issued only with the approval of the Peo-
ple's Bank. The transfer of B shares must comply with "applicable na-
tional regulations" which are established under other legislation.
6 6
Foreign investment in a company raises the question of whether
such a company constitutes a "joint venture" or "foreign invested enter-
prise" under China's existing legislation. The answer depends on the
percentage of foreign investment. A company in which foreign invest-
ment accounts for more than 25% of the total shares must obtain after
its establishment an approval certificate from the Ministry of Foreign
Economic Relations and Trade.67 Since Article 4 of China's Joint Ven-
ture Law provides that in general the foreign party's share in a joint ven-
tously issuing shares to staff and workers purchased with the collective welfare and other funds. See
supra note 14, art. 56.
63 Supra note 13, art. 10.
64 Supra note 13, art. 12. In the Shenzhen Regulations and the Shanghai Regulations, the corre-
sponding figures are 30 million and 5 million. See supra note 14, arts. 13, 41; note 15, art. 17.
65 Supra note 13, art. 19. For similar provisions in the Shenzhen Regulations see supra note 14,
art. 43.
66 Supra note 13, art. 30(3). For local legislation see the Provisional Measures of Shenzhen
Municipality for Administration of Special Renminbi-Denominated Shares, December 16, 1991, and
the Provisional Measures of Shanghai Municipality for Administration of Special Renminbi-Denom-
inated Shares, November 25, 1991 (in author's possession).
67 Supra note 13, art. 13(5). See Requirement for Approval of Chinese-Foreign Joint Stock
Company in Shenzhen Regulations, supra note 14, arts. 42, 43 and similar requirement in Shanghai
Regulations, supra note 15, art. 19. Further, the issuance of B-shares can only be made by an ap-
proved joint stock company which has government permission for foreign investment or which is
being reorganized into a foreign investment enterprise. See art. 9 of Shanghai B-Share Rules, and
art. 7 of Shenzhen B-Share Rules (in author's possession).
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ture should be 25% or greater, it appears that this provision means that
such an enterprise will be treated as a joint venture (or, if appropriate, a
wholly foreign-owned enterprise) under other Chinese legislation. 68 The
Regulatory Opinion does not expressly state this, but it does provide that
a company with a certificate from the Ministry must comply with the
Regulatory Opinion, as well as the laws, rules and regulations applicable
to "foreign invested enterprises."'6 9 It seems likely that a company estab-
lished under the Regulatory Opinion with more than 25% foreign own-
ership would both enjoy the rights and privileges of, and bear the
responsibilities of, "foreign invested enterprises" under China's legisla-
tion. To the extent that China's legislation on joint ventures and wholly-
foreign owned enterprises cannot be applied literally or directly to com-
panies established under the Regulatory Opinion due to the different cor-
porate forms used in these separate legislative acts, it will probably be
applied mutatis mutandis or indirectly. Thus, how existing Chinese leg-
islation on foreign invested enterprises will apply to companies estab-
lished under the Regulatory Opinion with over 25% foreign investment
is not very clear.
The situation under the Shenzhen and Shanghai Regulations is
clearer. Under the former, a Chinese-foreign joint stock limited com-
pany must have at least 25% foreign participation and such a company
will be granted the treatment accorded to Chinese-foreign equity joint
ventures under China's joint venture legislation.7' The Shenzhen Regu-
lations also provide that any tax exemption or reduction granted to a
foreign invested enterprise will not be recalculated if it is restructured
into a company.71 The Shanghai Regulations state that any company
with a foreign investment share of 25% or more can enjoy the preferen-
tial treatment available to Chinese-foreign joint ventures under China's
joint venture legislation.72
Another issue that the Company Legislation poses for foreign inves-
tors is: who is a foreign investor? The Regulatory Opinion does not de-
fine the term "foreign investor," but it is clear it includes U.S., European
and Japanese investors. But does it include investors of the Hong Kong,
Macao or Taiwan areas of China? In three places the Regulatory Opin-
ion refers to both foreign investors and investors of the Hong Kong, Ma-
68 Supra note 6. See also Law of the PRC on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises (in author's
possession).
69 Supra note 13, art. 115.
70 Supra note 14, arts. 45, 46.
71 Supra note 14, art. 46.
72 Supra note 15, art. 139.
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cao or Taiwan areas of China. 73 In other Articles, reference is only made
to "foreign investors."'74 It is unclear in the latter case whether the inves-
tors of Hong Kong, Macao or Taiwan area of China are intended to be
included. For example, does the requirement of Article 12 that a com-
pany with foreign investment have a registered capital of not less than
RMB $30 million apply to companies with Hong Kong investment?
Now? After July 1, 1997? The answers are not clear.
The provisions in the Company Legislation on government supervi-
sion, shareholders' freedom of action, the protection of state property
and the restrictions on foreign ownership will be disincentives for foreign
investment in companies organized in accordance with it.
V. CONCLUSION
The current status of China's evolving legislation on corporations
reflects contradictions in China's changing economy. Since the start of
the economic reform in 1979, China has changed from a planned econ-
omy to a "socialist commodity economy" and is now a "socialist market
economy."7 These changes require adjustments to the organization of
state-owned enterprises which still remain the backbone of the Chinese
economy. The Company Legislation was designed to provide a legal ba-
sis for state-owned enterprises in this new economic environment. Thus,
the Company Legislation limits the rights of private enterprises and for-
eign enterprises in the new companies.
Previously, China had three separate forms of corporate enterprises,
state-owned enterprises, private enterprises and foreign-invested enter-
prises, each of which had its own special legal regime. The Company
Legislation is a tentative first step in what will probably be a long term
process of unifying China's legislation on companies. It is possible to
perceive a tendency in Chinese legislation over the last several years to
apply the same rules to foreign and domestic enterprises. At present, this
process is only in a formative stage and is confronting many contradic-
tions. One of these can be seen in the application of existing joint venture
legislation to the Regulatory Opinion.
The Company Legislation provides foreign investors with a new
means of investing in China. Most foreign corporations interested in ac-
73 Supra note 13, arts. 29, 24(3), 24(4).
74 Supra note 13, arts. 13(3), 13(5), 30(3).
75 The concept of the "socialist commodity economy" was officially established in the Decision
on the Economic Institutional Reform. See supra note 8, at 7-8. The concept of "socialist market
economy" has replaced the "socialist commodity economy" after the first session of the National
People's Congress earlier this year. See WORLD DAILY, February 7, 1993 (in author's possession).
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tive management of their investments in China will prefer joint ventures
under existing Chinese joint venture legislation. Foreign investors inter-
ested in passive investment, however, may find the opportunities pro-
vided by the new Company Legislation to be attractive.
